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Introduction
Since 1978, actors, personal managers and talent agents have
been regulated by the California Talent Agencies Act.' The Act
regulates those individuals whose primary purpose and function is
procuring employment for an artist. It requires individuals who en-
gage in procurement activities be licensed. Personal managers by na-
ture are unlicensed. If a personal manager is unlicensed, she cannot
legally enforce her compensation agreement for procurement activi-
ties with an artist. In such cases, the personal manager can appeal to
the California Labor Commission. Once notified of a dispute, the
California Labor Commissioner convenes an administrative proceed-
ing where each party may state her case. After this hearing, the Labor
Commissioner issues a decision. Generally, the Labor Commission has
strictly interpreted the Talent Agencies Act. But by precluding com-
pensation to a personal manager, the Talent Agencies Act fails to take
into account the realities of the entertainment industry: specifically,
the difficulty of unknown artists securing representation licensed to
procure employment. Often artists must rely on a personal manager to
obtain their first "gig." As a result, the Talent Agencies Act creates a
conflict between rational behavior and lawful activities.
Sometimes a personal manager may legally enforce a compensa-
tion agreement that conflicts with the strict interpretation of the Tal-
ent Agencies Act. This continuum is best illustrated by two California
Appellate court decisions; Wachs v. Curry2 and Waisbren v. Pepper-
corn.3 The specific issues in dispute were whether or to what extent
an unlicensed personal manager may procure employment for an art-
ist.4 In 1993, the Seventh District Appellate court, in Wachs, held that
a personal manager does not violate the Talent Agencies Act if the
procurement constitutes an insignificant portion of his or her total
contractual services to the artist. 5 Two years later, the First District
Appellate court rejected this incidental exemption in Waisbren. The
Waisbren court established a brightline rule, declaring that a personal
manager must always be licensed in order to procure employment for
an artist.6
1. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (Deering 1996).
2. 13 Cal. App. 4th 616 (1993).
3. 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995).
4. David Steinberg & Yakub Hazzard, Employment Services May Trigger Act,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1996, at B7.
5. Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 628.
6. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 262.
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The California Labor Commission exacerbated this conflict by
abandoning the Wachs significance test and enforcing the Waisbren
standard.7 The commission reasoned that the Waisbren holding is
more appropriate because the "Waisbren court upheld the Labor
Commissioner's long-standing interpretation that a license is required
for any procurement activities, no matter how incidental [these activi-
ties are] to the agent's business as a whole."' Because the First District
cannot overrule the decision of the Seventh District, Wachs is still
valid law. Hence, the California Labor Commission's arbitrary deci-
sion to follow Waisbren muddies the waters of the California enter-
tainment industry by creating confusion over which standard a per-
sonal manager can legitimately rely upon when carrying out her
duties.9 Thus, the personal manager finds herself in a precarious eco-
nomic position. 10
The personal manager plays a prominent role in the economic vi-
tality of the entertainment industry." Nineteen-Ninety-Six was the
most successful year for Hollywood at the box-office in thirty-seven
years.' 2 This success is not the result of legendary Hollywood illusion.
Rather it is the product of the hard work of the many individuals who
toil in the entertainment industry-from the actor, to the executive
assistant, to the personal manager.13 Historically, the personal man-
ager in the entertainment industry has enjoyed a prominent position.'4
The personal manager finds the artists and nurtures them to star-
dom. 5 Specifically, "[t]he manager's function is to groom the young
artist, open doors through connections with agents and casting direc-
tors to make it easier for the artist to pursue her career. [They] don't
look at credits,. . . [t]hey look at talent-raw talent."' 6 The personal
manager calls on her resources and helps "the artist in all their crea-
7. Miles Locker, Enforcement of the California Talent Agencies Act: Procedures for
the California Labor Commissioner, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 11 (Fall 1996).
8. Id.
9. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 257.
10. Id.
11. Neville L. Johnson & Daniel Webb Lang, The Personal Manager In The
California Entertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 380 (1979).
12. Brian Fuson, Year Ends With Highest Admission Totals in 37 Years, HOLLYWOOD
REP., Jan. 2, 1997, at 1. Box office receipts "surged eight percent... to an all-time high
near 5.92 billion [and] ... the number of tickets sold rose seven percent to an estimated
1.35 billion." Id.
13. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 380.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Muriel Broadman, To Be or Not to Be... An Actor With a Personal Manager,
BACK STAGE, Nov. 4, 1988, at 1A.
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tive endeavors." 17 These relationships create opportunity for the art-
ist. Yet the majority of the money generated from personal managers'
hard work goes into the pocket of others under the existing statutory
scheme in California. 18
Consider the following hypothetical.19 Imagine yourself as a per-
sonal manager in the entertainment industry. One day at a local res-
taurant, you strike up a conversation with your waiter, who claims to
be an aspiring actor. You recognize the waiter has a spark that spells
success. Knowing that an unknown actor will not be able to obtain
significant exposure, you decide to give the kid a break by offering to
represent him as his personal manager. After sending the actor to a
lawyer, you both enter into a personal management contract.
In hopes of jump-starting the actor's career, you place a call to
your very good friend who happens to be a television producer. Your
friend agrees to take a look at the actor's publicity packet and decides
to offer the actor a chance to audition for a proposed network comedy
series. The actor performs well at the audition and is offered the part.
The show is a success and actor's career blossoms. His sudden notori-
ety garners attraction and further offers.
Then one day, the actor declares that your services are no longer
required and terminates the contract, refusing to pay your commis-
sion. You file a claim in superior court for breach of contract. To
counter your breach of contract claim, the actor files a petition with
the California Labor Commission asserting that you procured em-
ployment as an unlicensed talent agent, violating the Talent Agencies
Act. Under the terms of the Act, the Labor Commissioner convenes
an administrative hearing. At the hearing, the Labor Commissioner
determines that your one call to your friend the producer is a pro-
curement activity and the contract is declared void. In addition, the
Labor Commissioner disgorges your commissions. You file a de novo
appeal with the Superior Court. However, this proves futile. The re-
sult in this hypothetical seems rather punitive. If not for the efforts
taken by the personal manager on behalf of the artist, success would
have been a fleeting fantasy. But this result frequently occurs under
the current statutory system in California.
17. Id. at 2A.
18. Id. at IA.
19. This hypothetical is based a series of Labor Commission cases and is meant to
emphasize the current situation that a personal manager faces.
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Statutory limitations have been imposed on the breadth of the
personal managers' creative and business counseling duties.2 ° Specifi-
cally, in states such as California and New York, which hose a large
portion of the entertainment industry, these statutes strictly regulate
individuals who attempt to procure employment for an artist without a
state-issued license.2' For instance, New York's General Business
Law22 "exempts from licensing those [individuals] whose 'business
only incidentally involves the seeking of employment' for their cli-
ents." 23 While California's Talent Agencies Act 24 goes one step fur-
ther by mandating "a license.., for any procurement activity, no mat-
ter how incidental to the agent's business as a whole." 25 As a result,
the personal manager in California faces an untenable situation. If the
manager attempts to open the door for the artist, the manager's action
constitutes procurement of employment under the Talent Agencies
Act.26 Thus, California's license requirement is counter-intuitive to
the economic realities of the entertainment industry because the Act
ignores the vital contribution the personal manager makes to an art-
ist's career. 27
This note addresses the current conflict in case law surrounding
the California Talent Agencies Act. It examines the validity of the
Wachs v. Curry28 incidental procurement exemption and Waisbren v.
Peppercorn's29 strict rule prohibiting procurement without a license. It
then suggests alternatives which may lead to more equitable solutions
for artists, personal managers, and talent agents. Part II di:cusses the
history of the Talent Agencies Act and its application to cases which
preceded Wachs. Part III explores the Wachs decision and its resulting
"significance test." Part III also evaluates the significance test through
an analysis of Labor Commission determinations. Part IV discusses
the impact of the Waisbren decision and return to a strict interpreta-
tion of the Talent Agencies Act and its subsequent enfoicement by
the Labor Commission.
20. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (Deering 1996); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 171
(McKinney 1996).
21. Id.
22. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171 (McKinney 1996).
23. Paul Karl Lukacs, How New York and Tennessee Regulate Talent Agencies, 14
ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 15 (Fall 1996).
24. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (Deering 1991).
25. Locker, supra note 7, at 11.
26. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 471.
27. Id.
28. 13 Cal. App. 4th 616 (1993).
29, 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995).
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Part V offers possible solutions to mitigate the conflict created by
the Wachs and Waisbren decisions. This note weighs whether a return
to the Wachs "significance test" is advisable or whether the California
Legislature should revisit a more expansive incidental exemption. In
addition, this note explores other jurisdictional approaches to em-
ployment relationships in the entertainment industry. Specifically, it
analyzes New York's incidental exemption. Part VI discusses alterna-
tive methods which offer a more realistic regulatory approach in light
of the personal manager's duties. Finally, this note discusses whether
this conflict could be resolved by instituting a more equitable remedy
scheme applicable to both parties.
I
Beginnings: Legislative Regulation in the Entertainment
Industry and Protection of the Artist
Since the turn of the century, California has been concerned with
artist welfare in the entertainment industry. The state has passed a se-
ries of statutes designed to protect the performer from scam artists
who offer stardom and riches.3" In 1913, the legislature passed the Pri-
vate Employment Agencies Law, establishing licensing requirements
for all types of employment agencies operating within the state.31 The
law regulated "theatrical employment agencies and theatrical con-
tracts." 32 To enforce the 1913 law, the legislature passed an amend-
ment in 1923, "empowering the state Labor Commission to hear and
determine all controversies." 33 Shortly thereafter, in 1937, the legisla-
ture incorporated the Artist Manager Law into the state's labor code,
signaling the importance of guarding the artist's welfare in the enter-
tainment industry.34
In an effort to create further protections for the artist, the Cali-
fornia Legislature revamped the regulatory framework for employ-
ment agencies in 1943. 35 The Artist Managers Act created new regula-
tory categories which recognized the varying functions and needs
within the different fields of entertainment.36 Specifically, the law
30. Philip R. Green & Beverly Robin Green, Talent Agents and the New California
Act, ENT. L. REP., Sept. 1987, at 80.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. This amendment also established the right to a de novo appeal.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 384. Specifically, the categories covered the
various types of artists' managers such as: the motion picture employment agents, theatri-
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stipulated that the duties of the artist's personal manage:r included
procuring employment, advising, and counseling the artist's career.37
Thus at the end of 1943, the California legislature designated four dis-
tinct areas of regulation in the entertainment industry.38 However, the
growth of the industry resulted in employment relationships which did
not fit neatly into one classification-often relationships straddled all
four. As a result, the classifications proved too cumbersome to imple-
ment.
The confusion surrounding the 1943 Act is exemplified in Raden
v. Laurie.39 The case attempted to define allowable procurement ac-
tivities which a personal manager, not licensed under the Artist Man-
agers Act of 1943, could undertake.40 The case involved a conflict be-
tween Piper Laurie, a child actress, and her manager, Ted Raden.41
Piper Laurie and her mother entered into a non-exclusive manage-
ment agreement with Raden.42 Under the agreement, Raden
"promised" to secure engagements for Laurie in theater, radio, mo-
tion pictures and television, for a ten percent commission.43 In July
1948, the parties entered into a second agreement which specified that
Raden would act only as an advisor and counselor to Laurie and re-
ceive ten percent of all her professional earnings until the actress'
twenty-first birthday.44 However, Laurie and her mother became
"disenchanted with Raden" and terminated the agreement.45 Subse-
quently, Raden filed suit in superior court against Laurie for breach-
of-contract damages. 46 At the trial, Laurie moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that Raden, in promising to obtain employment,
had acted as an unlicensed employment agent.47 The 'trial court
granted Laurie's summary judgment and Raden appealed.48
cal employment agent, the employment agent and the artist manager. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 120 Cal. App. 2d 788 (1953).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 779.
43. Id.
44. Id. The agreement specifically designated Raden to act as Piper's business man-
ager as well as "to counsel and advise [Piper] in connection with all business activities.
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require [Raden] or authorize [Raden] to seek
or obtain employment for the undersigned, [Piper]." Id. at 779 n.1.
45. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 394.
46. 120 Cal. App. 2d at 779.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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The Appellate court rejected Laurie's argument that the act of
seeking employment, rather than any specific contractual provisions,
triggers the licensing requirement under the Artist Managers Act.49
Instead, the court held that an unlicensed personal manager's activi-
ties in seeking employment will trigger the licensing requirements of
the Act only if the "contract were [found to be] a mere sham and sub-
terfuge designed ... to misrepresent and conceal the true agreement
of the parties and to evade the law."50 But the court failed to establish
whether "one not licensed as an artists' manager [may] engage in the
procurement of employment." 51 Thus, Raden appeared to provide for
some allowable unlicensed procurement activity, as long as the activity
did not result from contractual "fraud or pretext. 52
Nevertheless, the holding failed to clarify which specific activities
and classes of people in the entertainment industry were regulated
under the Artist Managers Act.53 The employment categories of the
1943 Act strained under the continued expansion of the industry and
the rise of new employment relationships. In an attempt to clarify the
law and focus on the procurement activities of talent agents, the Cali-
fornia Legislature repealed the classifications for motion picture and
theatrical employment agents in 1967.54 But the Raden holding did not
reduce the confusion because the Artist Managers Act still failed to
reflect accurately the dynamics of the industry.55 As the industry ex-
panded, talent agencies "increased in size and complexity which in
turn depersonalized the artist-talent agent relationship." 56 As a result,
49. Id. at 782.
50. Id.
51. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 395 (citing Respondent's Brief at 11).
52. Id. at 396.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 378.
55. Id.
56. Id. The forties witnessed a major retraction in the economic structure of the film
industry. The postwar years saw families opting to stay home and watch television. As a
result, the old Hollywood studio system with its long term employment contracts declined.
Numerous actors and actress found themselves looking for work. Thus, the talent agent
became the primary conduit for employment opportunities for artists.
In the 1975 California State Senate, Licensing and Regulation of Artist Managers
Hearings, Claude McCue, Executive Secretary of AFTRA commented that need for an
agent has grown because "[i]ndividual actors really don't have an open door to producers.
It's almost impossible for that individual likely to get through to the casting office to see
[the producer] without a liaison, without an intermediary who is a talent agent, who might
be known particularly by that producer .... The Licensing and Regulation of Artists Man-
agers, Personal Managers, and Musicians Booking Agencies: Hearings Before the Cal. Sen-
ate Comm. on Industrial Relations (Cal. 1975) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hearings].
With procuring of employment as the talent agent's primary business, the personal
[VOL. 20:223
the talent agency became more concerned with procuring employment
and less concerned with the day-to-day demands and problems of their
clients. This in turn led to the rise of the personal manager:57 "The
personal managers became involved in all aspects of the artists career,
from publicity to selection of the right lawyer." 58 The breadth of these
duties complicated the legislative classifications.59 In essence, "it was
becoming hard to avoid the growing confusion between duties of the
'personal managers' and the duties of the 'talent agent."' 60
The confusion surrounding the appropriate position of the per-
sonal manager within the state regulatory scheme came to a head in a
battle between the musical group Jefferson Airplane and their man-
ager, Matthew Katz.61 Buchwald returned to the issue addressed in
Raden: what is the "definitional boundary of 'artists' manager?" 62
Each member of Jefferson Airplane entered into a separate agree-
ment with Katz whereby he acted as each member's "exclusive per-
sonal representative, advisor and manager." 63 In addition, each con-
tract contained a provision which stated that-Katz would not act as an
employment agent.6' Within a year, a dispute arose.65 Kat, took the
matter to arbitration, while the band filed a petition with the Labor
Commission alleging that Katz acted as an unlicensed artist's manager
because he secured employment for the band.66 Katz argued that the
Labor Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear this matter and that
arbitration would facilitate the appropriate resolution of the. matter.67
The band filed suit in court to restrain the arbitration hearing, but the
trial court denied their claim.68 The band appealed.69
manager stepped in to attend to other needs, such as publicity and creative direction, that
were once the domain of the talent agent. This was particularly significant in the music
business where talent agents could not devote the necessary time to assisting in the selec-
tion of tracks for an album as well as production and marketing matters. Hearings, supra,
at 157-59 (comment by Joe Smith, President of Warner Bros. Records, Inc.).
57. Hearings, supra note 56, at 157-59 (comment by Joe Smith, Presidenat of Warner
Bros. Records, Inc.).
58. Fred Jelin, The Personal Manager Controversy: Carving the Turf, 359 PLI/PAT 473
(1993).
59. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 395.
60. Id.
61. Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967).
62. See Raden, 120 Cal. App. 2d at 778.
63. Buchwald, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 347.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 352.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 353.
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The Appellate court held that Jefferson Airplane had made a
prima facie showing that Katz had violated the Artist Managers Act
by attempting to procure employment on numerous occasions. 70 Thus,
the Labor Commission was held to have jurisdiction over the case.71
Subsequently, the Labor Commissioner determined that Katz had
acted as an unlicensed artist's manager and ordered him to return over
twenty-five thousand dollars in commissions.72 Katz appealed the La-
bor Commissioner's determination, 73 but the Superior Court dis-
missed his appeal after he was unable to meet the bond require-
ments.74 Katz sought review of the Labor Commission decision to the
California Supreme Court on the grounds that the Labor Commis-
sioner lacked jurisdiction.75 The California Supreme Court affirmed
the original jurisdiction of the Labor Commission.76 In a subsequent
related case, the California Supreme Court guaranteed the right to
trial de novo. 77
The Buchwald cases thus established the authority of the Labor
Commissioner to determine controversies and guaranteed the right of
trial de novo.78 However, the combined cases left the lingering ques-
tion: "what constitutes 'activities' which might trigger regulation un-
der the Act?, 79 The inability of the court to explain which activities
trigger the licensing requirements prompted the California legislature
to step into the fray and construct a workable solution.80
In an attempt to refine the role of the personal manager as well as
the licensing requirements of the Artist Managers Act, legislators in-
troduced several bills to codify an incidental exemption."' At the Cali-
fornia State Senate Hearings, 2 Howard Thaller, attorney for the Con-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 356.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 358.
73. Id. at 352.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Buchwald v. Katz, 8 Cal. 3d 493, 503 (1972).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 402.
80. Gary Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager in California: A Legislative
Solution, 6 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 837, 860 (1985) (citing Johnson & Lang, supra note
11, at 388).
81. Hearings, supra note 56, at 143-44.
82. Id. Concerns about the need for consistency and uniformity prompted Thaler to
introduce an incidental exemption law. Thaler argued that "[p]ersonal manager laws of
both states should be consistent because personal managers frequently operate out of both
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ference of Personal Managers, West Coast, advocated for the enact-
ment of an incidental exemption based on New York General Busi-
ness Law. 83 The California legislature refused to accept Thaller's pro-
posal, and instead attempted to develop a workable statutory
system.84 The legislature amended the "Artists' Managers Act" to the
"Talent Agencies Act of 1978. ",85 The intent of the Talent Agencies
Act was to "regulate those individuals whose primary purpose and
function is the procurement of employment for the artist. '' 8 However,
the Talent Agencies Act failed to stipulate which individuals and ac-
tivities fell under the purview of the licensing requirements, and it also
failed to provide a bright line for the industry to follow. Thus the pre-
vious problems continued.8 7
The Labor Commissioner strictly interpreted the Act in a series
of disputes between prominent entertainers and their personal man-
agers, disallowing all unlicensed procurement of employment, no mat-
ter how incidental. 88 The first case involved a conflict between Bo
Derek and her personal manager, Karen Callan. 89 In 1978, an acquain-
tance informed Callan that Blake Edwards was looking for a "perfect
ten" to play a role in his proposed movie "Ten." 9° Shortly thereafter,
Callan mentioned to Blake Edwards that she knew the "perfect ten"
for the role.91 Derek, Edwards and his representatives arranged a
meeting. 92 It was alleged that Callan actively negotiated in this meet-
ing on behalf of Derek.93 After the meeting, Derek and Callan sup-
posedly entered into an agreement whereby Callan agreed "to negoti-
ate for Derek in regards to posters and t-shirts ..... ,94 Subsequently,
Derek terminated the employment relationship. 95 Callan filed suit,
alleging breach of contract.96
states, making it desirable for the laws to be the same." Id.
83. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 171 (McKinney 1996).
84. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 388.
85. Id. at 378.
86. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 860 (citing Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 388).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Derek v. Callan, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-80 (1982); Pryor v.
Franklin, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 17 MP 114 (1982).
89. See Callan, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-80.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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To counter Callan's suit, Derek filed a petition with the Labor
Commissioner, claiming that Callan violated the Act by procuring
employment without a license.9 7 The Commissioner rejected Callan's
assertion that her activities did not fall under the Act because she pro-
cured only incidental employment.98 Callan argued that the
"legislature meant to regulate only those individuals whose primary
purpose was seeking employment and not personal managers who
might be involved in 'incidental' procurement. of employment."99 In
response, the Labor Commissioner stated that Callan's position was
comparable to a claim that "you can sell one house without a real es-
tate license or one bottle of liquor without an off-sale license." 100 In
addition, the Labor Commissioner observed that the legislature re-
jected an incidental procurement exemption when the 1978 Act was
enacted. 101 Callan's procurement of employment for Derek therefore
constituted a violation of the licensing provisions of the Act.10 2 Thus,
the Derek case marked the beginning of the Labor Commissioner's
strict interpretation of allowable procurement activities under the Act
for individuals who are not licensed. 10 3
In another dispute involving Richard Pryor and his personal
manager David Franklin, the Labor Commissioner was afforded an
opportunity to further its strict interpretation of the Act through the
application of a broad definition, of what activities constitute pro-
curement.1°4 Pryor alleged that his 1975 personal management agree-
ment was void because Franklin acted as an unlicensed talent agent in
violation of section 1700.4.105 Pryor prayed for disgorgement of com-
missions from 1975-1980.106
The Labor Commissioner found that Franklin acted as an unli-
censed talent agent.10 7 The Commissioner determined that Franklin
promised and secured employment for Pryor in movies, television
shows, and live performances, as well as a recording contract.08 In
97. Id.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id.
104. Pryor, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 17 MP 114.
105. Id. it 4.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id.
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addition, the Commissioner found that Franklin falsely portrayed
himself as Pryor's talent agent in numerous business dealings.10 9
Franklin counter-argued that his activities did not fall within the
Act because the Act was intended to regulate those individuals who
actively seek employment opportunities for their clients.lrO Franklin
asserted that he only responded to solicitations or offers and he was
not actively seeking employment for Pryor."' The Labor Commis-
sioner rejected Franklin's construction of the Act holding that it ran
counter to the "well-established principles which [the Labor Commis-
sion] choose to follow."'1 2 For example, the Labor Commissioner
stated that the furthering of an offer constitutes a significant aspect of
procurement." 3 Because its intended purpose is to reach an agree-
ment to market an artist's talents, this activity is prohibited." 4 In ad-
dition to finding Franklin in violation of the Act, the Labor Commis-
sioner held that Franklin was guilty of moral turpitude because he
abused his trust with Pryor by committing Pryor to projects purely for
his own economic gain." 5 Based on these findings, the Labor Com-
missioner voided the agreement and instructed Franklin to remit over
three million dollars in commissions.116The Derek and Pryor decisions illuminate the Labor Commis-
sion's strict interpretation of the Talent Agencies Act.'17 Yet the cases
fail to provide brightline rules for determining which activities trigger
the Act. Thus, the California legislature was once again forced to re-e-
valuate and amend the Talent Agencies Act."'
In re-evaluating the 1978 Act, the legislature sought to construct a
model act. It therefore implemented several experimental provisions
in 1982.119 First, additional language allowed an unlicensed individual
to work in conjunction with a licensed talent agent in negol:iating em-
ployment contracts.120 Second, the recording exception was added.12'
109. Id.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 20.
117. See, e.g., Callan, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-80; Pryor, Cal. Lab. Comm. No.
TAC 17 MP 114.
118. Green & Green, supra note 30, at 81.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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This provision allowed for soliciting, offering or procurement of a re-
cording contract by an unlicensed individual. 22 Finally, the legislature
created the California Entertainment Commission to review and rec-
ommend changes to Act.12 3
The California Entertainment Commission, 2 4 addressed six is-
sues.1 25 First, under what circumstances may a personal manager pro-
cure, offer, promise or attempt to procure employment or engage-
ments? Second, what changes, if any, should be made in the Act's
provisions exempting a person who procures recording contracts for
an artist? Third, should the criminal sanctions be reinstated? 126
Fourth, should the added sunset provisions be deleted? 127 Fifth,
should the entire Act be repealed and/or should there be a separate
licensing law for personal managers? 128 Finally, what changes should
be made to the Act? 129
Three years later, the Entertainment Commission delivered its
report. 30 The Commission maintained that the Act should neither be
repealed nor should a separate statutory scheme for personal manag-
ers be instituted.' 31 This decision reflected the Commission's belief
that the Act protected the artist by permitting only licensed individu-
als to procure employment.1 32 Furthermore, the Commission con-
cluded that there was no room for an incidental exemption. 133 The
Commission stated that "exceptions in the nature of incidental, occa-
sional or infrequent activities... cannot be permitted: one either is, or
is not, licensed as a talent agent.... There can be no 'sometimes' tal-
ent agent, just as there can no 'sometimes' professional in any other
licensed field of endeavor."'134
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The commission included Ed Asner, John Forsythe, Cicely Tyson, Jeffery Berg,
Roger Davis, Richard Rosenberg, Bob Finkelstein, Patricia McQueeny and Larry
Thompson.
125. REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA ENTERTAINMENT COMMISSION (1985) [hereinafter
REPORT].
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 20.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 11.
134. Id. at 11-12.
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Although the Commission rejected the implementation of an in-
cidental exemption, it did suggest that the experimental provisions-
allowing unlicensed individuals to work in conjunction with a talent
agent, repealing of criminal sanctions, and the exemption for an unli-
censed individual to solicit, promise or procure a recording contract-
be fully incorporated into the Act. 35 With the California Entertain-
ment Commission findings in hand, the legislature once again at-
tempted to overhaul the Talent Agencies Act.136
The Act now defines a talent agency as a person or corporation
engaged in the procuring, offering, promising or attempting to procure
employment or engagements for an artist.137 Talent agents are also
allowed to counsel or direct artists in the development of their ca-
reer.1 38 An artist is defined as an "individual who renders services on
the legitimate stage and in production of motion pictures, radio artists,
musical artists.... The Act contemplates that all employment must be
procured in accordance with the licensing requirements.' 139 Under
section 1700.5 individuals who procure employment must obtain a li-
cense as talent agent.' 40
To become a licensed talent agent under section 1700.4, one must
file an application and pay a fee of $25,'141 a license fee of $225, and
branch office fee of $50.142 Section 1700.15 requires that each talent
agent post a $10,000 surety bond.14 3 Under section 1700.44 (a) the la-
bor commission is granted jurisdiction over controversies which arise
under the Act.144 In addition, section 1700.44 imposes a one year stat-
ute of limitations on claims. Finally, the right to appeal de novo to the
superior court is guaranteed. 45
While the 1986 version of the Talent Agencies Act provides a tidy
framework for talent agents, it fails to fully consider the realities of
the entertainment industry and the prominent role that personal man-
agers play. The Act envisions the talent agent as the most significant
135. Id. at 2.
136. Green & Green, supra note 30, at 81.
137. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (Deering 1996).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (Deering 1996).
141. Id.
142. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (Deering 1996).
143. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.15 (Deering 1996).
144. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (Deering 1996).
145. Id.
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player in the entertainment industry. 46 Yet, in reality, the role of a
talent agent is limited to procuring employment for artists.1 47 In cer-
tain circumstances, a talent agent's role may be more expansive, in-
volving deal-making, artistic and career advice. 148 But overall, the per-
sonal manager is more deeply involved in the artist's career. 149
A personal manager sees that all facets of the artist's career run
smoothly: she serves as the gatekeeper, the guardian angel, and the
supportive parent for the artist.1 50 Additionally, a personal manager
may assist the artist in making decisions relating to diverse matters
such as an artist's public image and mystique. 151 She is also involved in
selecting of other individuals, such as an attorney and business man-
ager, to handle particular facets of the artist's career. 52 The personal
manager's indispensability is unquestioned in the industry by all ex-
cept the Labor Commission. 153
II
Creation of a Workable Standard
A. Wachs v. Curry and Progeny
The California Entertainment Commission's refusal to recom-
mend an incidental exemption left the personal manager in an unten-
able position. 154 As Derek v. Callan155 and Pryor v. Franklin156 dem-
onstrate, the personal manager was extremely vulnerable to the Labor
Commission's strict construction of the Act. That the Labor Commis-
sioner can base determinations on inferential evidence only com-
pounded this situation."' Thus the personal manager faced a Hob-
son's choice: either take the risk and procure employment or commit
professional "suicide." This situation changed with Wachs v. Curry.158
146. Kenneth J. Abdo, Agents, Managers, and Lawyers, A Roadmap for the Entertain-
ment Attorney, 14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 3 (Fall 1996).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Johnson & Lang, supra note 11, at 380.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 381.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-80 (1982).
156. Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 17 MP 114 (1982).
157. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 850.
158. 13 Cal. App. 4th 616 (1993).
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Wachs effectively leveled the playing field for personal managers in
regards to procuring incidental employment.159 Under Wachs, per-
sonal managers could present an affirmative defense in their conflicts
with artists.1 60 The Labor Commissioner, through a series of cases, de-
veloped the Wachs significance test into an equitable standard under
which to adjudicate conflicts.
The newly-created incidental exemption for personal managers
arose out of a conflict between entertainer Arsenio Hall and his per-
sonal managers Robert Wachs and Mark Lipsky.16' In 1987, Mr.
Wachs and Mr. Lispky were introduced to Arsenio Hall by their busi-
ness partner, actor Eddie Murphy.1 62 At the time, Hall's career was
expanding at a fast clip and he felt that he needed the assistance of a
manager.1 63 Shortly thereafter, Hall entered into a personal manage-
ment contract with Wach's and Lipsky's company, X-Management. 164
During contract negotiations, Wachs promised Hall "that he would
get [Hall] the best deals available. ' 165 According to Hall, Wachs left
him with the impression that X-Management would, "provide all the
necessary services, including legal advice and procurement of em-
ployment., 166
Wachs immediately went to work, re-negotiating Hall's contract
with Fox167 as host of their late night TV show as well as entering into
negotiations with Paramount regarding a supporting role in Eddie
Murphy's movie "Coming to America." 168 Later, Paramount ap-
proached Wachs and Lipsky to discuss development of a late night
talk show hosted by Hall.' 69 Negotiations proceeded and a deal was
struck.1 70 However, Hall was unaware that Wachs and Lipsky had po-
sitioned themselves as Production Executives, thus benefiting from
weekly salaries of $5,000 each.171
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Hall v. X Management, Inc., Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 19-90 (1992).
162. Id. at 8.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 15.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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The show was a success, prompting several major studios to ap-
proach Hall regarding a production deal.' 72 Hall authorized Wachs
and Lipsky to contact the 'studios and enter into negotiations for a
production deal. 173 The negotiations netted several lucrative offers,
and Hall accepted Paramount's $7 million offer. 174 Both Wachs and
Lipsky received a commission of $1.5 million.175 However, the busi-
ness relationship quickly soured after Wachs informed Hall that the
parties had entered into an oral contract to divide the talk show's pro-
ceeds.176 Hall denied having entered into any such agreement, and in
1990 Hall terminated the management agreement. 77 Later, Hall filed
a petition with the California Labor Commission to void the manage-
ment contract.
178
The Labor Commission found for Hall, voiding the management
contract on the grounds that Wachs had acted as an unlicensed talent
agent in violation of section 1700.4.179 The Commissioner held that on
"at least eight occasions... X-Management engaged in and carried on
the occupation of a talent agent on behalf of the petitioner, [thus]
violating [the] provisions of the Talent Agencies Act.' 180 Further-
more, the Commissioner found that X-Management "engaged in acts
of self-dealing and overreaching .. ."181 The Commissioner pointed
out that when Wachs and Hall entered into the personal management
agreement, Wachs was aware of Eddie Murphy's interest in Hall
playing a significant role in "Coming to America."'18 2 The Labor
Commissioner therefore not only found that Wachs violated the Tal-
ent Agencies Act but that he failed to act in the best interests of his
client.' 3 As a remedy, the Labor Commission awarded Hall damages
in excess of $2.1 million.184 This sum represented the total allowable
damages available to Hall under the Act's one year statute of limita-
tion.185
172. Id. at 17.
173. Id. at 18.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 19.
176. Id. at 20.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Id. at 25.
183. Id. at 51.
184. Id. at 50.
185. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:223
DON'T BITE THE HAND THAT FEEDS
An uproar followed the Labor Commissioner's determination in
Hall v. X Management.1 86 The decision ". . . galvanized managers...
nationwide to criticize strict California licensing laws which they say
don't give managers the leeway to take risks with unknown artists who
later blossom into money trees." '187 Following the adverse Labor
Commissioner's determination, Wachs filed an appeal, alleging that:
the licensing provisions of the Act, are unconstitutional on their face
and as applied because no rational basis exists for providing an ex-
emption from the licensing requirements to those who procure re-
cording contracts but not for those who procure other contracts in
the entertainment industry and because it cannot be determined
from the lanuage of the Act which activities require licensing as a
talent agent. r8
The Appellate Court dismissed Wachs' assertion that no rational
basis exists for the recording exemption.189 The court found that the
California Entertainment Commission's report "provided a suffi-
ciently rational basis for the challenged exemption in view of the
proposition that persons in the same general type of business may be
classified differently where their methods of operation are not the
same."
190
The court also considered whether the licensing requirements
should be void for vagueness.1 91 Here, Wachs argued that the "term
occupation of procuring employment [as used in section 1700.44 (a)]
does not sufficiently define conduct [undertaken by a personal man-
ager] which requires a license." '192 To resolve this issue, the court re-
viewed the history of California's regulation of the personal manager
to determine the meaning of "occupation of procuring employ-
ment." '193
First, the court looked to the Managers Act of 1943.194 The 1943
Act defined an artist's manager as one who directs "clients in devel-
186. TV Stats, Managers Tussle Case Reignite Criticism of Agent Laws in New York,
California. NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1992, at 1.
187. Id. Wach's attorney, Howard Weitzman, reacted to the decision by commenting
on the Act. He stated, "the law is archaic, it's bizarre, and it's inconsistent with the custom
in the industry.... It makes managers less likely to want to do the best job they can for
their clients." Id.
188. Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 620.
189. Id. at 626.
190. Court Upholds Facial Constitutionality of California Talent Agencies Act in Case
Between Arsenio Hall and Former Manager, ENT. L. REP., Aug. 1993 [hereinafter Court
Upholds].
191. Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 626.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 627.
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opment and advancement of their professional careers and who pro-
cures, offers, promises, or attempts to procure employment or en-
gagements for an artist. '195 Next, the court reviewed the language in
the Talent Agencies Act, finding that the personal manager had been
redefined as "a person or corporation who engages in the occupation
of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employ-
ment or engagements for an artist., 196
After reviewing the legislative history, the court concluded that to
effectuate the intent of the Act, the term "occupation of procuring
employment" was to be determined according to a balancing test that
measures the significance of the agent's employment procurement
function compared to the agent's counseling function as a whole.
197
The court explained that an individual must be licensed if her
"employment procurement function constitutes a significant part of
the agent's business as a whole." 198 Finally, the court held thatthe use
of the term procurement in the Act was not so vague as to render the
Act facially unconstitutional. 199
The court upheld the Labor Commissioner's determination, but
in the process erected a judicial exemption, providing the personal
manager with an affirmative defense to lessen her financial expo-
sure.200 Personal managers were able to argue to the Labor Commis-
sioner that they did not violate the Act by procuring incidental em-
ployment, thus protecting their well-earned commissions. 20 1 Yet the
Wachs significance test did not subordinate the remedial nature of the
Act, as evidenced by the Appellate Court's decision to affirm the La-
bor Commissioner's determination.20 2
The Wachs decision was a major victory towards safeguarding the
financial security of the personal manager. The holding, however, of-
fered little guidance in defining what activities would constitute a sig-
nificant part of a manager's business as a whole. 2 3 As a result, cases
since Wachs have grappled with what activities constitute extensive
procurement.20 4 The Labor Commissioner initially developed a bal-
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Court Upholds, supra note 190.
198. See Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 628.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. California Labor Commissioner Voids Contract Between Actor and Personal Man-
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ancing test with overall activities on one side and incidental procure:
ment activities on the other.20 5 But the liberal application of the
Wachs significance test was gradually restricted to those contracts
which are silent about procurement and to situations in which a man-
ager inadvertently steps over the line.206
The first case to apply the Wachs' significance test in the context
of a balancing test was Church v. Brown.2°7 The Church case is signifi-
cant because it further defines the term "occupation" in the Wachs
significance test.208 Ross Brown and Thomas Hayden Church met at a
seminar in Dallas, Texas in 1988.209 At the time, Brown was working
as a casting director on the movie "Stolen Moments," and Church was
a struggling actor.210 Brown encouraged Church to travel to Los Ange-
les to audition "for a part in the movie.211 Brown privately coached
Church for the role and presented him with a fake resume on William
Morris Talent Agency letterhead, which he insisted was necessary for
Church to obtain the part in "Stolen Moments." 212 After several call-
backs, Church received the part.213
Following his role in "Stolen Moments," Church entered into a
management contract with Brown.214 At the time the parties signed
the contract, Brown stated that he would use "his contacts, influence,
and expertise in the industry to get Church acting jobs .... "215 After
several false starts, Church landed a starring role on the network TV
show "Wings." 216 Shortly thereafter, Church ceased making commis-
sion payments to Brown.217
ager Who was Not Licensed as a Talent Agent, Because a "Significant Portion" of the Man-
ager's "Business as a Whole" Involved Procuring Employment for Clients, ENT. L. REP.,
Oct. 1994.
205. Church v. Brown, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 52-92 (1994).
206. California Labor Commissioner Voids Contract Between Rapper Recording Artist
and Former Personal Manager, Because Management Agreement Provided that Manager
Would Not Attempt to Obtain Personal Engagements even though Manager was Not Li-
censed as Talent Agent, ENT. L. REP., Dec. 1994 [hereinafter California Labor Commis-
sioner].
207. Church, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 52-92 (1994).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 3.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 3-4.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Id.
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Brown submitted the matter to arbitration.2 18 In response,
Church filed a petition and was granted a hearing before the Labor
Commission.219 At the hearing, Brown argued he met the Wachs ex-
emption because his procurement activities did not constitute a sig-
nificant portion of "his business as a whole" in comparison to his ac-
tivities outside the management agreement with Church.22 '
The Labor Commission rejected Brown's interpretation of the
Wachs significance test, declaring instead that the correct interpreta-
tion looks at those activities which involve the representation of talent
separate from other employment activities outside the artist-manager
relationship.221 In this case, Brown asserted that his job as a casting di-
rector constituted a significant portion of his business as a whole. 222
However, the Labor Commissioner dismissed Brown's claim, stating
that "other activities in which the person may engage in ... are not
considered or counted as part of the person's business as a whole in
making the assessment. 223
Under the Labor Commissioner's interpretation, a person cannot
present their second career as an affirmative defense to a violation of
the Act.224 In addition, the Labor Commissioner elaborated on what
constitutes a significant portion of a manager's business as a whole. 225
According to the Church decision:
procurement of employment constitutes a 'significant' portion of ac-
tivities of a [personal manager] if the procurement is not due to in-
advertence or mistake or is simply a de minimis aspect of the overall
relationship between the parties when compared with the [personal
manager's] counseling functions on behalf of the artist.226
Under Church, then, a manager qualifies for the incidental exemption
only if her procurement activities result from inadvertence and are
incidental to her overall duties.227
Furthermore, in Church, the Labor Commissioner developed a
two-prong test for application of the Wachs significance test.228 To
show that a personal manager has violated the Act, a petitioner must
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1.
220. Id. at 10.
221. See California Labor Commissioner, supra note 206.
222. Church, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 52-92 at 12.
223. Id. at 11.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 12.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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establish that their "contractual relationship was permeated and per-
vaded by employment activities." '229 After the petitioner has estab-
lished this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the personal manager
who must present sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that the pro-
curement activities did not constitute a "significant part of [his] busi-
ness as a whole." In other words, procurement activities must have
happened by inadvertence or honest mistake.230
Here, Church met his burden of proof and established a prima
facie case that his contractual relationship with Brown was
"permeated and pervaded by employment activities. '" 231 The Com-
missioner then found that Brown "failed to produce any evidence that
would show that such activities were not a significant part of" his
business as a whole.232 As a result, the Labor Commissioner deter-
mined that Brown acted as an unlicensed talent agent and declared
the management contract "illegal and void, thus denying Brown access
to any commissions. 233
Finally, the Labor Commissioner clarified the one year statute of
limitations under section 1700.44.234 Under this section, an artist can
make a claim at any time alleging that the manager acted as an unli-
censed talent agent.235 However, the artist is entitled only to a refund
of the commissions paid to the personal manager within the last
year.236 Church, therefore, only collected fees paid to Brown over the
past year.237
Through Church, the Labor Commissioner developed the Wachs
significance tests into a single standard that embodies the Talent
Agencies Act's tenet of preventing artist exploitation. This standard
evolved further through a series of cases that refined the definition of
what constitutes a significant portion of the personal managers' busi-
ness as a whole 238 and narrowed the application of the "significance
229. Id.
230. Id. at 13.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. Section 1700.44 reads: "No action or proceeding shall be brought pursuant to
this chapter with respect to any violation which is alleged to have occurred more than one
year prior to commencement of the action or proceeding." CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44
(Deering 1996).
236. Church v. Brown, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 52-92.
237. Id. (Church was entitled to fees totaling sixty-eight thousand dollars).
238. See, e.g., Pamela Denise Anderson v. Robert D'Avola, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC
63-93 (1993).
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test" to those personal managers who in good faith inadvertently en-
gage in procurement activities. 239
Shortly after the Church determination, the Labor Commissioner
developed the Wachs significance test into a more equitable tool by
bifurcating the business relationship of the artist and manager into
distinct periods, thus lessening the financial exposure of the manager
to an adverse determination under the Act.240 The case which
prompted this salutary development involved Pamela Anderson and
her manager Robert D'Avola.241 In September of 1990, D'Avola and
Anderson entered into an oral agreement, whereby D'Avola agreed to
serve as Anderson's personal manager.242 In order to assist Anderson
in obtaining employment, D'Avola arranged for Barbara Pollins, an
agent at ICM, to serve as a "hip pocket agent. '243
In 1991, D'Avola was informed by an acquaintance that Disney
was interested in a "Playboy-type actress" for a planned network
situation comedy series. 24 D'Avola represented himself to Disney as
Anderson's agent and arranged for an audition.245 Disney selected
Anderson to play the character of Lisa on "Home Improvement., 246
Shortly after, Anderson fired D'Avola and hired another personal
manager. 247  However, one month later, Anderson re-hired
D'Avola.24 s The parties then executed a written contract specifying
that D'Avola would serve as her personal manager.249 At the same
time, Anderson signed with a talent agency to seek further employ-
ment opportunities. 250
In 1992, Anderson was selected for the part of C.J. Parker on the
television show "Baywatch. '' 251 Shortly thereafter, Anderson stopped
paying D'Avola commissions and terminated his services. 252 D'Avola
239. See, e.g., Ivy v. Howard, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-94 (1994).
240. Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. As a hip pocket agent, Pollins played no significant role in procuring employ-
ment for Anderson. Instead, Pollins acted in accordance with D'Avola's instructions, con-
tacting potential employers on his behalf. Id.
244. Id. at 5.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 6.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 7.
252. Id. at 8.
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submitted the dispute to arbitration.2 53 Dissatisfied with the arbitra-
tor's decision, Anderson brought the matter before the Labor Com-
missioner claiming that D'Avola was not entitled to commissions be-
cause he acted as an unlicensed talent agent, thus violating the Talent
Agencies Act.254
The Labor Commissioner took an unusual approach to the An-
derson case.255 The Commissioner bifurcated the business relationship
into two distinct periods.256 The first period covered conduct that oc-
curred between the 1990 oral agreement and the execution of the 1991
personal management contract.257 The second period covered the lat-
ter half of the relationship, focusing on activities subsequent to the
1991 personal management contract.258
The Labor Commissioner applied the Wachs significance test to
determine if D'Avola's procurement functions constituted a signifi-
cant portion of his duties as compared to his counseling function as a
whole. 259 Under this standard, the Labor Commissioner determined
that the first period of the party's business relationship was
"permeated and pervaded by employment procurement activities un-
dertaken by [D'Avola].",26° The Labor Commissioner held that
D'Avola's use of Barbara Pollins as a "hip pocket agent, 261 did not
meet section 1700.44(d)'s exemption for personal managers who work
in conjunction with a licensed talent agent.262 Rather, D'Avola's ar-
rangement with Barbara Pollins was nothing more than "transparent
subterfuge designed solely as a means of attempting to evade the li-
censing requirements of the Act."263
In effect, the Labor Commissioner implied that D'Avola used
Pollins' credentials as a front to procure employment for Anderson
without running afoul of the Act.264 Thus, the Labor Commissioner
determined that Anderson's role on "Home Improvement" was "a di-
rect result of [D'Avola's] unlawful procurement activities." 265 There-
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 10.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 9.
260. Id. at 10.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 11. The Labor Commissioner reached this determination by holding that
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fore, D'Avola was not entitled to commissions generated from Ander-
son's employment on "Home Improvement. 2 66 But D'Avola was en-
titled to compensation for activities undertaken during the second pe-
riod of the party's relationship because they were incidental to his
overall duties and Anderson had been represented by a licensed talent
agent.2 67 The Labor Commissioner held that these later procurement
activities no longer constituted a "significant part of [D'Avola's] rela-
tionship with Anderson."268 Therefore D'Avola was entitled to mo-
nies from Anderson's involvement in "Baywatch. ' 269
In Anderson, the Labor Commission stepped away from a strict
interpretation of the Act and took into consideration the entire busi-
ness relationship, protecting the personal manager from inadvertent
violation of the Act.270 While relaxing the rigid test, the Labor Com-
missioner punished D'Avola for soliciting employment for Anderson
from Disney.271 The outcome provided Anderson with an enormous
economic windfall.272 This result leads one to question whether the
Labor Commissioner is truly following the spirit of the Wachs stan-
dard.
The Labor Commissioner's interpretation of D'Avola's relation-
ship with Barbara Pollins, the hip-pocket agent, is illogical given the
difficulties for a "neophyte" artist in obtaining the services of a li-
censed talent agent.273 D'Avola instructed Pollins to initiate contacts
with producers for parts discovered by D'Avola through his subscrip-
tion to a script breakdown service. 274 This relationship does not seem
as invidious as the Labor Commissioner asserts.275 Thus, if the Labor
Commissioner had indeed employed the Wachs standard, logically,
D'Avola's activities would have been found to be incidental to his
overall duties, and would not have violated the Act.276 Nonetheless
that bifurcation of the business relationship may, in the majority of
D'Avola's arrangement to use Barbara Pollins as hip pocket agent failed the section
1700.44(d) exemption for unlicensed individuals to work in conjunction with a licensed tal-
ent agent. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93 (1993).
274. Id. at 4.
275. Id. at 10.
276. Id.
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cases, reduce the financial exposure of the personal manager and
therefore inject another dose of equity into the Wachs significance
test.
277
The Anderson case is representative of the equitable standard
that the Labor Commissioner has developed through its application of
the Wachs significance test.278 Several years later, however, the
Commissioner severely narrowed the Wachs significance test in a case
involving a rapper and his personal manager. That decision limited the
application of the Wachs significance test to exempt only those per-
sonal managers who in good faith inadvertently procure employ-
ment.279
In Ivy v. Howard,28° the Labor Commissioner limited the Wachs
significance test to only those situations where the personal manage-
ment contract is silent regarding procurement activities. 281 In 1992,
Ivy, known professionally as Domino, entered into a personal man-
agement contract with Jerome Howard and Cherie Kirkwood. 28 2 The
contract contained a clause stating that, as personal managers, How-
ard and Kirkwood would be responsible for obtaining personal en-
277. Id.
278. See also Flame Music v. Smith, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 23-92 (1992). There the
Labor Commissioner bifurcated a personal management contract and applied the Wachs
significance test. The Commissioner determined that the personal manager had violated
the Act in one period of the contract, but not the other. Smith and the members of Flame
Music, Inc. entered into a personal management contract, for Smith to provide services in
the areas of business affairs and creative counseling. During the first six months of the re-
lationship, Smith handled the band's cash management, obtaining capital for equipment
purchases as well as "attempting to procure bookings for live performances." Id. Shortly
thereafter, Smith's primary function changed to procuring live performance for the band.
In 1989 Flame terminated Smith's services. Smith filed a breach of contract claim in supe-
rior court, while members of the band petitioned the Labor Commissioner for a hearing to
declare the contracts void due to violations of the Talent Agencies Act.
As in the Anderson case, the Labor Commissioner bifurcated the business rela-
tionship into two periods-the first one beginning prior to 1987 and the later occurring af-
ter, and applied the Wachs significance test. The Commissioner found that, during the first
period of the relationship, Smiths counseling functions constituted a significant portion of
his business as a whole. Thus, Smith's activities prior to 1987 did not violate the Act. How-
ever, Smith's activities after 1987 were found to be predominately oriented towards pro-
curement of employment. As a result, the Labor Commissioner determined that Smith
acted in the capacity of an unlicensed talent agent in violation of section 1700.44 of the
Act. The holding of Flame Music thus follows the Labor Commissioner's holding in Ander-
son. In both cases, the Labor Commissioner's bifurcation of the business relationship into
distinct periods prevents the personal manager from facing daunting judgments in dis-
gorged fees. Id.
279. Ivy v. Howard, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-94 (1994).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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gagements for the artist.283 Ivy terminated the agreement and brought
the matter before the Labor Commissioner asserting that Howard
acted as an unlicensed talent agent.284
Howard asserted that he should be exempted from the licensing
requirement of the Act under the Wachs significance test for two rea-
sons.285 First, Howard claimed that he never attempted to solicit or
procure employment on the artist's behalf and Ivy had failed to estab-
lish that procurement activities constituted'a significant portion of his
activities. 286 Second, Howard asserted that the procurement clause in
the contract was surplusage. He never intended to carry out this obli-
gation; therefore, the clause should be ignored.28 7
The Labor Commissioner rejected Howard's assertion that he
qualified for the Wachs exemption, stating that Wachs is intended to
protect only those individuals whose personal management contracts
are silent on the issue of procurement and "who in good faith inadver-
tently step over the line in a particular situation and engage in conduct
that might be classified as procurement. ' 28 8 The Labor Commissioner
determined that Ivy's contract was "permeated and provided by
promises to procure personal appearances .... ,289 As a result, the La-
bor Commissioner declared the contract void, precluding Howard
from obtaining further commissions.290
The holding of Ivy eviscerates the Wachs significance test.291
However, Ivy is arguably an aberration in the cases following Wachs.
Howard did not procure employment for Ivy, he was penalized for
merely having a clause in the contract saying he was obligated to seek,
solicit and attempt to procure employment.292 Factually, the previous
cases which exempted personal managers from violations of the Tal-
ent Agencies Act all involved situations where the personal manager
sought employment for the artist on their own initiative.293 Yet, in this
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93.
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case, Howard was unjustly penalized by the Commissioner for not
carefully reviewing his contract.294
The Ivy case appears to be an attempt by the Labor Commis-
sioner to proscribe the liberal interpretation of the Talent Agencies
Act which followed the Appellate Court's determination in Wachs.295
But Ivy can be distinguished from Wachs and its progeny because
specific language in the contract instructed the personal manager to
seek employment for the artist. Thus, Ivy could be characterized as
only applying to those cases which have specific employment pro-
curement language in the contract.296 But given the history of the La-
bor Commission, Ivy most likely is an attempt by the Commissioner to
return to a strict interpretation of the Act.297
III
Making it Official: A Return to a Strict Standard with Waisbren
and Progeny
The decision in Waisbren v. Peppercorn298 signaled a return to a
strict interpretation and application of the Talent Agencies Act.299
The decision caught the entertainment industry by surprise and led to
confusion over its ramifications for personal managers.3°° Indeed, one
leading entertainment law journal commented that the Waisbren de-
cision had "thrown [the industry] a curve ball.... "301
In 1982, Brad Waisbren and the puppet design house, Peppercorn
Inc., entered into an oral agreement whereby Waisbren was to pro-
mote services available at Peppercorn.30 2 For six years, Waisbren
"assisted in project development, managed business affairs, supervised
clients relations, publicity and casting duties."3 3 On occasion, Wais-
294. Ivy, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-94.
295. Compare Ivy, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-94, with Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at
616.
296. Ivy, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-94.
297. Id.
298. 41 Cal. App. 4th 246 (1995).
299. Id.
300. California Law May Now Subject Personal Managers to Licensing Requirements,
ENT. L. REP., Nov. 25, 1996.
301. Id.
302. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Waisbren agreed to assist in project develop-
ment, supervise client relations, undertake publicity, perform casting duties, run the front
office, coordinate production and human resource matters, and advise Peppercorn on tal-
ent acquisition. Id.
303. Id.
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bren solicited and procured employment for Peppercorn, but this duty
was minor in comparison "to his other responsibilities. '" 304
In 1988, Peppercorn notified Waisbren that it was terminating
their relationship. 30 5 Waisbren filed a claim in superior court alleging
breach of contract.306 Peppercorn responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment arguing that Waisbren was precluded from alleg-
ing a claim for damages because he had acted as an unlicensed talent
agent.307 Because "his [procurement] activities were minimal and
merely incidental to his other responsibilities, '" 30 8 Waisbren contended
that he did not need a license. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for Peppercorn.30 9 Waisbren filed an appeal. 310
The Appellate Court upheld Peppercorn's summary judgment.311
In affirming the lower court's decision, the court analyzed six areas
pertaining to the Act.312 First, the court discussed whether Waisbren
had to be licensed as a talent agent for incidental or minimal pro-
curement efforts.313 To determine this issue, the court turned to sec-
tion 1700.5 of the Act.31 The court interpreted the language of the
Act to mean that no person shall engage in procurement of employ-
ment, however minimal, without a license.3" The court defined the
contours of a personal manager's duties "as one whose primary func-
tions are advising, counseling, directing and coordinating the artist in
development of their career." 316 The personal manager oversees the
"business and logistical concerns of the artist, not procurement of
employment. 317 The court then looked to legislative intent,318 finding
that the Act applies to those whose "occupation" involves procuring
employment.3 19 As a result, the court rejected Waisbren's interpreta-
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 251.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 250-51.
311. Id. at 263.
312. Id. at 252.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 253.
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tion of "occupation" as "the principal business of one's life. 320 In-
stead, the court embraced a broad definition, stating that a "person
can hold a particular "occupation" even if it is not his principal line of
work. "321
Second, the court determined that the Act is remedial in nature,
designed to correct abuses that "have long been recognized and which
have been subject of both legislative action and judicial decision. 3 22
As a result, the court determined that the Act should be liberally con-
strued to "ensure the personal, professional, and financial welfare of
artists." 323 The court concluded that exempting individuals from the
requirements of the Act because they engaged in incidental activities
provides little solace to those artists "who fall victim to a violation of
the Act. ' 324 Therefore everyone who procures employment, regard-
less of its proportion to their other activities, must be licensed. 325
Third, the court found support for this position in the established
practices of the Labor Commissioner,326 noting that the Labor Com-
missioner has "long taken the position that a license is required for
incidental procurement activities." 327 Fourth, the court reviewed the
findings of the California Entertainment Commission and found that
the Commission had rejected an exemption for incidental procure-
ment and advocated licensing all who procure employment.3 28 Fifth,
the court turned to the limited exception for an unlicensed person un-
der the Act.329 It determined that the Act only contemplates an ex-
ception for those individuals who work in conjunction with a licensed
talent agent.330 The court reasoned that if an incidental exemption
were allowed, it would render that exception superfluous. 331
Finally, the court turned to prior judicial construction of the Act
and the Wachs holding.332 Here, the Waisbren court stated that the
California Supreme Court under Buchwald had held that a license is
320. Id.
321. Id. at 254.
322. Id. at 255.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 259.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 260.
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required for procurement activities. 333 Thus the Wachs's exemption
was nothing more than "incorrect dicta, contrary to the intent of the
Act. '334 The Waisbren court further determined that the Wachs court
applied too narrow a concept of "occupation" and did not factor into
their holding the remedial or legislative intent of the Act, nor the
precedent established by the Labor Commission determinations.3 35
The Waisbren court therefore refused to follow the Wachs significance
test.336 The court stated "[tihere can be no 'sometimes' talent
agent[:] ... " a license is required for every degree of procurement ac-
tivities.337
The Labor Commissioner's decision to implement Waisbren
halted the judicial exemption for incidental procurement of employ-
ment. Even though Waisbren was adjudicated in a court without the
power to directly overrule the Wachs significance test, the Labor
Commissioner concluded that Waisbren had exposed the Wachs sig-
nificance test as wrongly decided dictum. 338 Thus, the Labor Commis-
sioner has embraced Waisbren's strict interpretation of the Talent
Agencies Act. 339 Although there have been few decisions utilizing the
Waisbren standard, the cases that have come before the Labor Com-
missioner are in stark contrast to those determined under Wachs.340
In Cernile v. D.B. Management,341 the Labor Commissioner ap-
plied the holding of Waisbren in determining that the manager's pro-
curement of two live performances out of a total of thirty constituted a
violation of the Talent Agencies Act.342 In 1991, Sven Gali (a music
group) entered into a personal management agreement with D.B.
Management. 343 The following year, the band performed in a total of
thirty shows.3 " The majority of these shows were procured by the
band's talent agent; however, D.B. Management did secure the band
employment for two shows.34 5 In 1992, the band informed D.B. Man-
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 255.
338. Locker, supra note 7, at 11.
339. Id.
340. Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 77-92 at 5 (1992),
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 2.
344. Id. at 3.
345. Id.
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agement that the agreement was terminated. 346 The band argued they
had a right to terminate the agreement without any further obligations
because D.B. Management had acted as an unlicensed talent agent.
347
D.B. Management asserted that its activities did not violate the licens-
ing requirement of the Act because the services were rendered outside
the state of California.34 The matter was brought before the Labor
Commissioner. 3
49
The Labor Commissioner determined that it had jurisdiction over
the case because D.B. Management was based in California and a
"substantial amount of business was carried out by telephone from
California."350 The Labor Commissioner applied the Waisbren hold-
ing, requiring a license for all procurement activities;35 1 D.B. Man-
agement's "promise to procure employment at the inception of the
[management agreement] and their procurement of the live perform-
ances subjects them to the licensing requirements of the Act. ' 352 Thus,
the Commission held that D.B. Management had acted as an unli-
censed talent agent, and D.B. was ordered to disgorge commissions
and expenses totaling $6,000. 313
The D.B. Management decision sets a chilling precedent for per-
sonal managers because in it the Labor Commissioner penalized indi-
viduals for activities which clearly constituted a miniscule portion of
their overall duties. 354 But the outcome of this case is not merely pu-
nitive. Rather, it sends a clear signal that if an artist is unhappy with
her personal manager for failing to provide the artist the "right"
dressing room, the artist need only allege a violation of the Talent
Agencies Act to extricate herself from the management contract. 355
Clearly, this does not serve the Act's intent of protecting the artist's
welfare.356 Indeed, it is questionable whether exploitation of the artist
was occurring in D.B. Management.357 However, according to the La-
bor Commissioner, the intent of the Act is best served by policing the
346. Id. at 3-4.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 2.
349. Id. at 5.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 6.
354. Id. at 4.
355. Edwin McPherson, Talent Agencies Act A Personal Manager's Nightmare, 17 L.A.
LAW. 17 (May 1994).
356. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (Deering 1996).
357. Cernile, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 77-92.
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activities of personal managers and penalizing them for any viola-
tion.358 But as the outcome of the D.B. Management case demon-
strates, this position sets a dangerous precedent allowing artists to in-
validate their personal management contracts by claiming a violation
of the Talent Agencies Act.359 This behavior on the part of the artists
frustrates the intent of the Act.
IV
Wachs versus Waisbren: A Return to a Workable Standard
The Waisbren decision was an attempt to return to a strict inter-
pretation of the Talent Agencies Act. 360 However, given the nature of
the entertainment industry, especially a "neophyte artist's" difficulty
in obtaining representation by a licensed talent agent, Waisbren's
holding runs counter to the interests of both the artist and the per-
sonal manager. The artist's need to obtain work justifies greater
flexibility in employment relationships. A return to the Wachs stan-
dard benefits both the artist and the personal manager.
The Waisbren court interpreted the term "occupation" too
broadly.361 The court stated that an individual can have several occu-
pations, rejecting Waisbren's definition of occupation "as the principal
business of one's life."3 62 The court asserted that its definition is con-
sistent with the intent of the Act's licensing scheme. 363 However, the
Wachs approach more effectively advances the intent of the Act and
provides more equity in the artist-personal manager relationship.364
Following Wachs, the Labor Commission applied the Wachs definition
of procurement to cases such as Anderson and Church.365 The equita-
ble standard developed in post-Wachs decisions promotes the reme-
dial nature of the Act through bifurcation.366 Furthermore, the post-
Wachs cases created an equitable safeguard by requiring that unli-
censed procurement activities constitute a significant portion of
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 254.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 628; Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-
93 at 10.
365. Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93; Church, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC
52-92.
366. See, e.g., Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93.
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overall duties to trigger the Act.367 The Wachs definition constitutes a
workable standard because it focuses the Act on those individuals
committing pervasive violations of the Act, not ones who book a sin-
gle engagement. 368
The Waisbren court held that any procurement activity requires a
license.369 Presuming that the Talent Agencies Act was intended for
the artist's benefit, one must ask whether occasionally procuring em-
ployment is harmful. It would be difficult to find a personal manager
or a talent agent who thinks procuring a single engagement is detri-
mental to the artist's welfare.37 ° For instance, the amount of money an
incidental booking might generate is minuscule in comparison to the
dollars generated by the employment procured by a licensed talent
agent. In sum, the Waisbren standard is an overzealous application of
the Talent Agencies Act, which ultimately undermines the Act's pur-
pose.371
The Waisbren court's effort to facilitate the remedial aspect of the
Act does more harm than good to the artist. Subjecting the personal
manager to the expense of complying with the Act's regulations would
severely limit the avenues of opportunity available to the struggling
actor.372 No longer would a personal manager be willing or able to in-
vest in young talent; opportunities would be limited to a few lucky
artists.373
Waisbren asserted that the incidental exemption was an unwork-
able standard on the theory that its vagueness would undermine the
intent of the Act.374 The court asked, "should a manager's procure-
ment activities no longer be considered 'incidental' when they exceed
ten percent... or perhaps the line should be drawn at twenty-five per-
cent or fifty percent. '375 According to the court, nothing in the Act
dictates a clear answer. Ironically, the court's fear is unfounded, as the
Labor Commission had been making this very determination all
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 246.
370. Roger Davis, Vice President of the William Morris Agency, testified at the Cali-
fornia Senate Hearings that "neophyte artists" will not attract the attention of a Talent
Agent until they can command significant earning power. Hearings, supra note 56, at 171-
72.
371. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 246.
372. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 2.
373. Id.
374. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 254.
375. Id.
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along.376 Despite the Waisbren court's concerns, Wachs and its prog-
eny have demonstrated a workable standard.
The Wachs significance test has been adopted and refined suc-
cessfully through a series of Labor Commission determinations. In
Church, the Labor Commissioner added to the significance test by
clarifying what constitutes a "significant portion" of a personal man-
ager's overall duties.377 In addition, Anderson's bifurcation of the art-
ist-personal manager relationship provides an example of an equitable
standard that considers the entire employment relationship, not just
an isolated act. 78 The Labor Commissioner further refined the test in
Ivy to individuals who procure employment by inadvertence, thereby
eliminating protection to those individuals who were the extreme vio-
lators of the Act. 379 Through these refinements, the Labor Commis-
sion had developed a workable incidental rule that was equitable in
application.
In concluding that the incidental procurement was an unworkable
standard, the Waisbren court ignored the history of New York's inci-
dental exemption for personal managers. New York, like California, is
home to a substantial portion of the entertainment business. In order
to prevent the exploitation of artists, the New York General Business
Law mandates that every employment agency must obtain a license.3 80
An employment agent is defined as a person who attempts to procure
employment or engagements for circus, vaudeville, the variety field,
radio, television, opera, ballet, legitimate theater or other entertain-
ment's or exhibitions .. ."381 Personal managers are exempted from
the licensing requirements if their "... . business only incidentally in-
volves the seeking of employment for their clients." 382 The New York
judiciary has determined the meaning of "incidental," but such a de-
termination rests upon a review of the contract's description of the
personal manager's obligatory services.383
In Paine v. Lerbman,384 a New York state court held that an in-
dividual does not meet the incidental exemption if their primary con-
376. See, e.g., Church, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 52-92; Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm.
No. TAC 63-93.
377. Church, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 52-92.
378. Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93.
379. Ivy, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-94.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Friedken v. Walker, 395 N.Y.S.2d 611,613 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
384. 321 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1971).
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tractual obligation is to procure employment.385 In this case, the
plaintiff and the defendant entered into a personal management
agreement, whereby the defendant promised to secure a recording
contract.38 6 The court held that under the employment contract the
defendant's only function was to solicit and secure a recording con-
tract.387 In short, Paine holds that for a personal manager to come
within the ambit of the incidental exemption, the majority of her du-
ties must be related to management issues, not employment procure-
ment.38
s
The New York incidental rule was further defined in Friedkin v.
Walker.389 There, a motion picture and legitimate theater personality
brought suit to recover commissions paid to a booking agent who had
secured lectures and other engagements. 390 The court based its de-
termination on the language in the contract, holding that the booking
agent did not meet the incidental rule because the agent's primary
business was seeking employment, not managing the artist's affairs. 391
New York's incidental rule is thus similar to the Wachs significance
test.392 Like Wachs, the New York rule places the activities of the per-
sonal manager under discrete review.393 There is no substantial differ-
ence between the two standards.
Given the transcontinental nature of the industry, it is illogical
not to develop a uniform standard that protects the artist, while per-
mitting the personal manager to carry out her duties without the fear
of being penalized. Uniformity of the laws, however, was not a pri-
mary concern of the Waisbren court.394 It is possible to envision a sce-
nario where a California artist obtains the services of a New York per-
sonal manager and is then "discovered" by a Los Angeles studio. The
studio and the New York-based personal manager enter into negotia-
tions and strike a deal.395 Under the New York rule, as well as the
Wachs significance test, such a scenario may be legal if the personal
manager spends a majority of her time tending to the artist's creative
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. 395 N.Y.S.2d 611,613 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 259.
395. See, e.g., Cernile, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 77-92.
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issues.396 However, under Waisbren, the personal manager would vio-
late the Act because the transaction took place in California.3 97
Clearly, the need for uniformity of the laws cannot be easily dismissed.
The Waisbren court determined the viability of the incidental ex-
emption through the Labor Commission's prior interpretation of the
Act.398 Here, the court asserted that the Labor Commission has long
taken the position that a license is required for procurement.3 99 To a
certain extent Waisbren is correct. The Labor Commission did require
a license for procurement activity, as evidenced in Pryor and Derek.40
Ironically, however, it was the Labor Commissioner, as the defendant
in the Wachs case, who successfully argued at the appellate level for
the significance test in determining violations of the Act-a fact which
the Waisbren court overlooked.4°'
Furthermore, after the Wachs decision, the Labor Commission
followed and expanded the Wachs significance test.40 2 In other words,
the significance test exists because it was urged on the courts by the
very state official responsible for enforcing the Talent Agencies Act;
and it has been used by that official in deciding cases under the Act
ever since. Logically, the court in Waisbren should have respected the
wishes of the administrative body implementing the Act, taking this
fact into account when it reviewed the Labor Commission's interpre-
tation of the Act, and letting the incidental exemption remain.
In further support of its decision, the Waisbren court relied on the
findings of the California Entertainment Commission, which rejected
the incorporation of a New York-type incidental exemption.4 3 How-
ever, the Commission based its findings on Labor Commission prece-
dents which preceded the Wachs case,4°4 leaving a lingering suspicion
that the Commission's decision might have been different in light of
Wachs and its progeny. Regardless, the Commission's report was
completed well over a decade ago and the entertainment industry has
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 259.
399. Id.
400. Pryor, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 17 MP 114; Derek, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC
18-80.
401. Personal Managers Must be Licensed as Talent Agents in California if They Seek
Employment for Their Clients, Even if Seeking Employment is Only an "Incidental" Activ-
ity, California Court of Appeal Rules; Earlier, Contrary Ruling by Another Panel Rejects it
as Dicta, ENT. L. REP., July 1996.
402. Id.
403. REPORT, supra note 125, at 2.
404. Id.
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grown dramatically, making it much more difficult for an artist to gain
exposure without the assistance of a personal manager. The personal
manager has become integral in developing the artist's career, and it
would therefore be wise to develop uniformity on this point.
The limited exemption provided by the Talent Agencies Act does
not adequately reflect the personal manager's role in the entertain-
ment industry. The 1986 Talent Agencies Act specifically exempts,
under section 1700.4(d), unlicensed individuals who work in conjunc-
tion with a licensed talent agent.40 5 The Waisbren court stated that this
limited exemption is the only exemption allowed under the Act.40 6
The court asserted that if the incidental procurement was allowed it
would directly conflict with the "'working in conjunction with' ex-
emption." 407 Yet, this exemption is of little value to the "neophyte
artist" who cannot get a talent agent in the first place. Even if the art-
ist is lucky enough to find a personal manager, it is highly unlikely that
a talent agent would be willing to work in conjunction with the per-
sonal manager on an unknown artist unless that artist had instant
profit potential. Thus, a paradox exists: only an artist who has worked
is in a position to obtain a talent agent, but the only way to work le-
gally is through the services of a talent agent. For example, in Ander-
son, the manager attempted to qualify under this exemption by getting
a "hip pocket agent;, 40 8 however, the Labor Commissioner declared
that this was an attempt to circumvent the licensing requirements of
the Act.409 Following Anderson, the Labor Commissioner advised that
this exemption will be extremely hard to meet unless the talent agent
explicitly invites the personal manager to work alongside in procuring
employment. But the Labor Commissioner has interpreted the ex-
emption too strictly, creating an undue burden on both the artist and
the personal manager.
In addition, the Act's exemption for the procurement of record-
ing contracts places a burden on personal managers who cannot repre-
sent musical groups.41 0 It seems logical that if an unlicensed individual
can procure a recording contract, then there should also be an inciden-
tal exemption for a personal manager to secure employment for other
kinds of artists. The argument that the recording exemption is based
on the different nature of the industry is a valid one, but the situation
405. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(d) (Deering 1996).
406. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 259.
407. Id.
408. See Anderson, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93.
409. Id.
410. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (Deering 1996).
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is no different for the "neophyte artist., 411 In sum the statutory ex-
emptions seem illogical at best and counterintuitive given the realities
of today's entertainment industry.
Since Wachs and Waisbren were decided by equivalent appellate
courts, a split in authority exists within California. 412 The Labor
Commission has compounded this split by choosing the Waisbren
standard to adjudicate Talent Agencies Act disputes. When a conflict
in appellate court decisions exists, "the court exercising inferior juris-
diction can and must make a choice between the conflicting deci-
sions." 413 Here, the Labor Commission is the tribunal with inferior ju-
risdiction, and thus was obligated to make a choice between the two
standards. The Labor Commissioner selected Waisbren on the theory
that it most accurately reflected the intent of the Act.4 14 However, this
decision has placed personal managers in an untenable position by ex-
posing them to adverse and costly decisions. Given the importance of
the entertainment industry to the state of California, the State Su-
preme Court or the legislature should take heed of this current crisis
and step in to resolve it.
V
Alternate Solutions
This note has attempted to refute the current views of the Labor
Commission about the Talent Agencies Act by exposing the inherent
inequity in the Waisbren standard. It has also advocated a return to
the Wachs standard, among other possible solutions. These solutions
range from the incorporation of a New York-type incidental exemp-
tion for incidental procurement 415 to the reliance upon fiduciary
duty416 and the institution of an equitable damage scale. 417
Although advocated numerous times and rejected by the Cali-
fornia Entertainment Commission, and the legislature, in 1978 and
1982, the Legislature should revisit the incorporation of a New York-
type exemption for the procurement of incidental employment for a
variety of reasons. First, the realities of the entertainment industry
411. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 2.
412. See, e.g., Wachs, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 616; Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 246.
413. Auto Equity v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455 (1962).
414. Interview with Miles Locker, Labor Commission Attorney, in San Francisco,
California (Jan. 28,1996).
415. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 12.
416. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983).
417. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 12.
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make it very difficult, if not impossible, for a "neophyte artist" to se-
cure representation from a talent agent when he or she first arrives in
Los Angeles.41 8 An artist will simply not be considered by a talent
agent until that artist has gained name-recognition of some value.419
Thus, the first person with whom a "neophyte artist" comes into con-
tact is the personal manager.420
The return to the incidental exemption would resolve the current
problem faced by personal managers. 421 The artist would be able to
gain the notoriety needed to advance his or her career and the per-
sonal manager would avoid the punitive measures of the Act.422 The
incidental exemption has a proven record of protecting not only the
artist, but also the personal manager.423 This is evidenced in the Labor
Commissioner's decisions following Wachs, as well as the success of
New York's incidental exemption.424
In order to promote artists, personal managers are forced to in-
vest "financially in their clients."425 Most new artists require living ex-
penses in addition to promotional and performing expenses.42 6 Thus, a
personal manager expends time and money on an artist who is unable
to obtain work because his name is not recognized by a licensed talent
agent.427 The personal manager is then left with two options: obtain a
talent agency license or procure employment for the artist.428
The Labor Commissioner would argue that the personal manager
should simply get a license.429 But obtaining a license is both time-
consuming and expensive for the personal manager already feeding
and clothing the "neophyte artist., 430 The state requires a $10,000
surety bond, application fees which range from $300 to $2,225, and the
maintenance of a separate office as a place of business. 43 1 In addition
to these state requirements, as a talent agent, the personal manager
would be further restricted by the numerous guild requirements-
418. Id.
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most notably, the limitation of talent agent commissions to ten per-
cent.432 Because the majority of neophyte artists are found by neo-
phyte personal managers who cannot afford the licensing fees,433 only
well-established management companies would be able to implement
the Labor Commission's scheme.434 Therefore, the only logical option
for the personal manager is to run the risk of violating the Talent
Agencies Act by procuring employment for the artist.435 The unten-
able situation of the personal manager provides reasonable grounds
for the incorporation of an incidental exemption either through legis-
lative action or a return to the Wachs significance test.
The incidental exemption would not, as talent agents may argue,
create an environment where personal managers have free reign to
procure employment, effectively usurping the role of the talent
agent.436 The exemption by definition is predicated upon a distinction
between the professional roles of personal managers and talent
agents. Even under the most liberal of interpretations, the law would
limit the activities of personal managers in seeking employment for
artists. On a practical level, it is not feasible for a personal manager to
attend to both the creative and employment needs of an artist who has
obtained a "modicum of success."4 37 Furthermore, it is evident that
talent agents control most of the lucrative relationships that lead to
the "big deals., 438 With the incidental exemption, personal managers
would be able to obtain the kind of employment that would create the
appropriate buzz for the artists, thus leading to representation by a li-
censed talent agent.439 In essence, the incidental exemption should be
thought of as a means to an end.
Most importantly, the incidental exemption would defeat at-
tempts by artists to extricate themselves from their personal manage-
ment agreements because something better comes along.440 The in-
corporation of an incidental exemption would rectify the current
problems associated with the unjust enrichment of the artist. Such a
432. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 3.
433. Roger Davis, Vice President of the William Morris Agency, testified at the Cali-
fornia Senate Hearings that "neophytes artists" will not attract the attention of talent
agents until they can command significant earning power. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 2
(citing Hearings, supra note 56, at 172).
434. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 2.
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439. Id. at 2.
440. McPherson, supra note 355, at 17.
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move would also effectuate the purpose of the Act-protecting the
welfare of the artists-rather than awarding them a fistful of dollars
they do not deserve.
Incorporating an incidental exemption should not remove the
personal manager from the watchful eye of the Labor Commission.
The personal manager should be required to comply with the Act's
regulations if they procure employment which violates the incidental
exemption. Furthermore, the incidental procurement activities of per-
sonal managers should be regulated under a fiduciary standard.441
Under fiduciary law, a business relationship is viewed in terms of
a dominant and a vulnerable party.442 The dominant party in a rela-
tionship-in this case, the personal manager-owes a high level of
duty towards the vulnerable party, the artist.443 In a fiduciary relation-
ship, the dominant party, the fiduciary, is entrusted with the power to
perform specific tasks."4
4
If the dominant party breaches this trust by failing to perform the
specific tasks, the vulnerable party has a variety of protections. 445 For
instance, the parties can enter into a contract specifying the scope of
the sanctioned activities as well as the appropriate remedies. 446 Fur-
thermore, the vulnerable party has a right to terminate the relation-
ship, suing for misrepresentation or misappropriation.447 Under fidu-
ciary law, the personal manager's actions are strictly controlled,
mitigating any fears that an incidental exemption would permit an end
run around the Act's requirements. 448
The return to a strict interpretation of the Talent Agencies Act
resulted in the imposition of severe damages against personal manag-
ers.449 The Talent Agencies Act seeks to protect the welfare of the
artist, but it is far from clear whether the most effective way to protect
the artist is to destroy the financial welfare of the personal manager. 450
The Act does address this concern through the one year statute of
limitations codified in section 1700.5.451 Under this provision, the art-
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442. Frankel, supra note 416, at 800.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 809.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 813.
447. Greenberg, supra note 80, at 13.
448. Id.
449. Waisbren, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 246.
450. Id.
451. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (Deering 1996).
19971 DON'T BITE THE HAND THAT FEEDS
ist can sue for commissions received by the personal manager only
within the past year. 452 But the statute of limitations does not stipulate
which activities are legitimate and which are in violation of the Act.
Thus the personal manager may suffer financial devastation for the
year the artist decides to file a petition with the Labor Commission.453
An equitable damages scale would better implement the intent of the
Act.
Under the Waisbren standard, an artist is empowered to refuse to
pay the personal manager a commission simply by filing a petition
with the Labor Commissioner declaring that the personal manager has
violated the licensing requirement of the Talent Agencies Act.454
Thus, the Waisbren decision provides the artist with a guaranteed eco-
nomic windfall. Under Waisbren, a personal manager is forced to dis-
gorge all fees collected within the statute of limitations, regardless of
the source of those fees. 455 Furthermore, assuming the Labor Com-
missioner declares the personal management agreement void, the per-
sonal manager is precluded from initiating a damages suit on breach of
contract or restitution grounds.456 This practice is illogical and an un-
just implementation of the remedial provisions of the Talent Agencies
Act.45
7
Moreover, prior to the Waisbren decision, the Labor Commission
had been in the process of creating a more equitable damage scheme
through the use of bifurcation.458 The Anderson holding is significant
in that the court only punished D'Avola, the personal manager for ac-
tivity which directly related to the violation of the Act's licensing re-
quirements.459 In contrast, the personal manager in Derek was forced
to return all commissions resulting from both the personal manage-
ment and collateral agreements over merchandising.460 Thus, bifurca-
tion creates a structure in which damages will reflect the monies cre-
ated through a violation of the Act, not through legitimate work.
In addition to endorsing bifurcation, several experts have advo-
cated the institution of an equitable damage scale.461 In his article, The
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Greenberg argues for a damage scale which accurately reflects the
harm committed.463 For example, the booking of one live show would
bring a fine equal to the commission payable to a licensed talent
agent. If a personal manager has violated the good faith and trust of
his client, as in the Pryor case, the manager would have fines levied
against him as punishment. 464 A damages continuum would inject eq-
uity into the enforcement of the Talent Agencies Act, thereby creating
punishment that fits the crime.
465
VI
Conclusion
It is undisputed that some aspects of the Talent Agencies Act
have had a positive impact on employment relationships in the enter-
tainment industry. The Act has sought to protect artists from exploi-
tation by unscrupulous individuals. Yet the Act, as interpreted by the
Waisbren court and administered by the Labor Commission, jeopard-
izes the vital relationship between personal managers and artists.
Because the Waisbren and Wachs decisions were handed down by
equal appellate courts, the Labor Commission can choose to enforce
either holding. Unfortunately, the Commission has elected to follow
Waisbren, which fails to consider the integral role of the personal
manager in advancing an artist's career. It is the personal manager,
not the talent agent, who discovers the artist and invests in his or her
future. A talent agent will rarely pay attention to an unknown artist
until a potential profit exists.466 Yet Waisbren's interpretation of the
Act prevents the personal manager from undertaking necessary inci-
dental activities that might lead to valuable and potentially lucrative
exposure for the artist. These difficulties, faced by both the artist and
the personal manager, warrant a return to the workable standard of
Wachs and its progeny.
Wachs is the more logical choice for the Labor Commission to
follow because it benefits both the personal manager and the artist.
The Wachs standard allows the personal manager to perform her du-
ties without fear of punitive measures, so that the artist sees her career
advance. While the standard is flexible for the parties involved, it does
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not eviscerate the intent of the Talent Agencies Act. The Wachs stan-
dard enables the artist-manager employment relationship to meet the
realities of the entertainment industry.
This note demonstrates that the Waisbren strict standard is too
rigid to serve the interests of artists in the contemporary entertain-
ment industry. It advocates either a return to the Wachs standard or
the adoption of other remedies which seek to inject equity into the
artist-personal manager employment relationship. With the rapid
globalization of the entertainment industry, all employment relation-
ships within this industry are at a crossroads. A strict interpretation of
the Talent Agencies Act inhibits the industry's general prosperity. The
legislature or the courts should therefore create a permanent equita-
ble standard to regulate one of the most fundamental employment
relationships in entertainment.
